A recent decline in Chinese real-estate prices is starting to shake confidence in the country's economic vitality and open a debate about whether the country's economy is over-leveraged. That's what made the real-estate bubble's aftermath so painful for the U.S. and Japan.

　　中國房價最近下降，開始動搖人們對該國經濟活力的信心，并引發中國杠桿率是否過高的爭論。正是這些，讓房地產泡沫的破滅給美國和日本帶來了如此大的痛苦。

　　Just two months ago, China expert Nicholas Lardy dismissed concerns about what he labeled a "so-called property bubble" during a conference at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

　　僅兩個月之前，中國問題專家拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)在華盛頓彼得森國際經濟研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)一個會議上，還以不以為然的態度看待人們對他眼中“所謂房地產泡沫”的擔心。

　　Now, he says a housing downturn could produce a "major, major economic correction" in China, a view shared by other mainstream economists.

　　Zuma Press2011年6月22日，貴州省貴陽市，花溪區一處公共租賃住房項目的建設工地。現在，他卻說，如果房地產市況回落，則有可能在中國引起一場“重大的經濟調整”。其他主流經濟學家也持這種觀點。

　　What changed? A growing realization that much of China's massive stimulus spending and lending of 2009 and 2010 ended up in land purchases, driving up prices in an unsustainable fashion. And a recognition that the Chinese economic system routinely produces bubbles and is unlikely to change any time soon.

　　是什么發生了變化？變化在于，人們越來越意識到，2009年和2010年中國大規模刺激性支出和貸款，有很大一部分最終都用來購買土地，導致房價以不可持續的態勢上漲。變化還在于，人們意識到中國的經濟制度經常導致泡沫產生，并且不太可能很快改變。

　　 The government keeps bank deposit rates well below the rate of inflation to benefit state-owned banks and other firms, which have the political power to defend the status quo. With few financial alternatives to beat inflation, Chinese savers buy real estate, even if supply soars ahead of demand.

　　(This story and related background material will be available on The Wall Street Journal website, WSJ.com.) 政府將銀行存款利率維持在遠低于通貨膨脹率的水平，從而有利于國有銀行和其他國有企業。而這些企業又擁有維護現狀的政治實力。由于其他抗通脹理財工具很少，中國儲戶就購買房地產，哪怕供應的增長遠遠超過需求。Between 2006 and 2010, investment in residential property jumped by half, to about 9% of China's gross domestic product, according to Mr. Lardy. During that time, real-estate prices in major cities in China roughly doubled.

　　據拉迪說，2006年到2010年，住宅類房地產投資增長50%，達到中國國內生產總值(GDP)的9%左右。在這段時期內，中國主要城市的房價基本上翻了一番。

　　During the next three to five years, says UBS economist Wang Tao, prices are bound to head sharply upward again because of the paucity of alternative investments for Chinese savers and the reliance of local governments on land sales for revenue. At some point, she figures, the boom could give way to a bust.

　　據瑞銀(UBS)經濟學家汪濤說，未來三到五年，由于儲戶替代性投資渠道的缺乏，以及地方政府收入對土地銷售的依賴，房價必定會再度大幅上揚。她預計這種繁榮可能會在某個時候歸于破滅。

　　Mr. Lardy expects the cycle to play out more quickly. Kynikos Associates short-seller James Chanos has been predicting for two years that a crash is imminent. No one knows for sure, of course. A number of events could trigger a big selloff, including a sharp rise in interest rates, the emergence of other investment options and higher taxes on property.

　　拉迪預計這種周期的循環會更快。對沖基金公司Kynikos Associates的空頭投資家查諾斯(James Chanos)兩年以來一直預計崩潰即將來臨。當然誰也不敢肯定是不是馬上就會出現崩潰。好幾個因素都有可能導致房價大跌，比如利率突升，其他投資渠道興起，以及針對房產的稅收增加等。

　　Estimates of how badly the economy could be damaged by a real-estate slump reflect different views of the structure of the Chinese economy.

　　房價暴跌可能對經濟造成多大傷害？這方面的不同估計反映出對中國經濟結構的不同看法。

　　The strength of the real-estate market directly affects the construction, steel, concrete, power and appliance industries. In all, about 50% of China's GDP is linked to the fate of its real-estate market, according to Standard Chartered economist Stephen Green.

　　房地產市場景氣與否直接影響到建筑、鋼鐵、水泥、電力和家電行業。渣打銀行(Standard Chartered)經濟學家王志浩(Stephen Green)估計，中國共計約50%的GDP都與房地產市場的命運相關。

　　While a downturn would batter the economy, Mr. Green said, it wouldn't be as devastating as the burst bubbles in the U.S. and Japan.

　　王志浩說，雖然房地產市場轉跌將給經濟造成沉重打擊，但其破壞性將趕不上美國和日本房地產泡沫的破滅。

　　In those cases, falling real-estate prices caused bad debt to mushroom, crippling the banking industry, too, and drying up credit.

　　在美國和日本，房地產價格的下降造成壞賬急劇增加，也給銀行業帶來嚴重破壞，并造成信貸枯竭。

　　However, in China, far fewer consumers use debt to buy homes. There isn't a Chinese equivalent of the U.S. subprime mortgage.

　　不過在中國，貸款買房的人要少得多。中國沒有相當于美國次級貸款這樣的產品。

　　Other analysts say there are far more leveraged purchases of real estate than recognized in the official statistics.

　　其他分析師說，購買房地產的貸款金額要遠遠大于官方統計。

　　 To fight the effects of the global downturn, Chinese state-owned banks, on government orders, loaned about $3 trillion, mostly to giant state-owned enterprises. The money was reported to have largely financed infrastructure projects, such as China's ambitious high-speed railway network.

　　為對抗全球經濟衰退的影響，中國國有銀行面對政府訂單，發放了約3萬億貸款，而放款對象主要是大型國企。據說這筆錢基本上都用于資助基礎設施建設，如中國雄心勃勃的高速鐵路網。

　　But many of the loans wound up financing real-estate purchases instead, said Deng Yongheng, director of the Institute of Real Estate Studies at the National University of Singapore.

　　但新加坡國立大學(National University of Singapore)房地產研究所所長鄧永恒說，上述貸款中，有很多到頭來還是變成了購買房地產的融資貸款。

　　Prices at auctions for residential land in eight major cities doubled in 2009, largely because of highly leveraged purchases by state-owned companies, he and three co-authors calculate. In March 2010, state-owned companies bid up the price of one piece of Beijing land to 10 times the asking price, according to one analyst.

　　鄧永恒與其他三位作者推測，中國八大城市住宅用地拍賣價格2009年出現了翻番，這主要因為國有企業高負債買地。一位分析師表示，2010年3月，北京一塊地皮在國有企業競相出價的哄抬之下，成交價為要價的10倍。

　　The magnitude of the leveraged purchases is hard to gauge.

　　負債買地的規模有多大，目前很難衡量。

　　One indication: Shortly after the Beijing land sale, the Chinese agency that oversees state-owned companies, ordered 78 firms--whose charters had nothing to do with real estate--to cease buying and selling property. Nearly a year later, in Feb. 2011, state-owned Xinhua news agency reported that just 14 firms had left the business and another 20 were expected to get out later in the year.

　　有跡象顯示，北京這塊地皮售出后不久，監管中國國有企業的政府部門就責令78家不以房地產為主業的央企停止房地產買賣行為。近一年后，即2011年2月，新華社報道稱，只有14家公司退出房地產領域，另外20家有望今年晚些時候退出。

　　A spokesman for the agency said that the firms needed time to finish their projects, but added that there isn't any prohibition against companies owned by provinces or municipalities to continue to invest in real estate.

　　上述部門的發言人說，這些央企做完手里的項目需要時間，但又說，沒有任何阻止省屬和市屬國企繼續投資房地產的禁令。

　　Over the past year, the Chinese government has put in place measures to temper real-estate sales, including raising the minimum downpayment for mortgages on second homes to 60% and enacting China's first property tax. A number of economists forecast those steps will drive down prices about 10% by year-end. With demand drying up for apartments, real-estate developers are starting to invest in mines, reports state-run China Daily.

　　過去一年，中國政府推出了多種樓市降溫措施，諸如提高第二套房首付比例至60%并頒布了中國首個物業稅等。很多經濟學家預測，在這些措施的作用下，房價到年底會下跌約10%。中國官方英文報紙《中國日報》(China Daily)報道說，由于公寓需求逐漸消失，房地產開發商開始投資礦產項目。

　　But few expect the antibubble measures to last, given concern by the government and Communist Party about sustaining growth, which they see as a key to social stability.

　　但預計反樓市泡沫措施將持續的人是少之又少，因為中國政府和共產黨關注可持續增長，認為這是維持社會穩定的關鍵。

　　Late last week, an HSBC manufacturing activity index registered an 11-month low. The government's official purchasing manager's index, which usually lines up with the HSBC data, is due to be published Friday.

　　 上周晚些時候，匯豐銀行(HSBC)的制造業活動指數出現11個月來的新低。中國政府官方采購經理人指數將于本周五發布，該指數一般與匯豐銀行的數據保持一致。

　　Charlene Chu, a Fitch Ratings Service analyst in Beijing, who has documented how China's official statistics understate total lending, said state-owned firms have taken on heavy real estate debt.

　　 惠譽國際評級(Fitch Ratings Service)駐北京分析師朱夏蓮(Charlene Chu)用資料證明，中國官方統計數據大大低估了貸款總額，并說中國國企已經背上了沉重的房地產債務。

　　Thus a sharp fall in prices would produce a raft of nonperforming loans and "would have an outsized impact on Chinese banks." In other words, a real-estate collapse could lead to a banking crisis--the kind of woes that have undermined the U.S. and Japan.

　　如此說來，房價暴跌將產生大量不良貸款，給中資銀行帶來巨大影響。換句話說，中國房地產市場崩盤可能導致銀行業危機，而這類危機曾削弱了美國和日本經濟。