If the Chinese renminbi does emerge over the next decade or two as one of the key global reserve currencies, as Beijing hopes, it will not be the result of a “big bang” announcement, but will instead develop through a series of seemingly small steps that reshape the way the Chinese currency is used.

　　如果像中國政府期望的那樣，人民幣果真在未來10年或20年內(nèi)成為全球主要儲備貨幣之一，那也不會是“爆炸性”聲明的結(jié)果，而將是通過一系列看似不大、改變?nèi)嗣駧攀褂梅绞降牟襟E來實(shí)現(xiàn)的。

　　The news that the Malaysian central bank has been quietly acquiring renminbi bonds is an important one of those steps.

　　有消息稱，馬來西亞央行一直在悄然買進(jìn)人民幣債券。此舉正是其中重要的一步。

　　The Malaysian investment is the natural next stage of a series of piecemeal reforms outlined over the summer to expand international use of the Chinese currency, including allowing certain investors limited access to China’s domestic bond market.

　　今年夏季，中國有關(guān)部門簡要介紹了一系列零散的改革措施，以擴(kuò)大人民幣在國際范圍內(nèi)的使用，包括允許特定投資者有限地進(jìn)入中國國內(nèi)債券市場。馬來西亞的此筆投資，是這些改革舉措自然而然的下一階段。

　　Yet the purchase also underlines the potential demand for renminbi assets among governments, banks and companies in Asia, even as the actual investment opportunities remain limited.

　　然而，此舉也突顯出亞洲政府、銀行和企業(yè)對人民幣資產(chǎn)的潛在需求，目前，實(shí)際投資機(jī)會仍然有限。

　　And that raises the crucial question about Beijing’s recent moves to “internationalise” the renminbi: will overseas demand for the Chinese currency overwhelm Beijing’s efforts carefully to manage the process?

　　同時，這讓外界就中國政府最近施行的人民幣“國際化”努力提出了一個重要問題：人民幣的海外需求，是否會壓倒中國政府謹(jǐn)慎管理這一過程的努力？

　　For the Chinese authorities, the move to permit central banks to buy renminbi is part of a controlled experiment. Beijing would like its currency to play a large role in trade settlement, reducing the volatility and costs that its exporters face when they are paid in foreign currency.

　　對于中國當(dāng)局而言，允許各國央行購買人民幣債券，是一項(xiàng)管控下的實(shí)驗(yàn)的一部分。中國政府希望人民幣在貿(mào)易結(jié)算方面發(fā)揮重大作用，降低中國出口商在獲得外幣支付時所面臨的波動性和成本。

　　However, Chinese policymakers admit that they are a long way from taking the crucial but politically difficult steps for the renminbi to become a genuine reserve currency.

　　然而，中國決策者承認(rèn)，他們遠(yuǎn)未采取政治上十分艱難的關(guān)鍵舉措，讓人民幣成為真正的儲備貨幣。

　　To facilitate holdings of renminbi assets, Beijing would need to knock down the dense wall of capital controls that limit foreign inflows and outflows of funds and loosen its tight grip on the domestic bond market and banking system. If China were to run trade deficits, that would also significantly boost the overseas circulation of Chinese currency.

　　為了便于海外持有人民幣資產(chǎn)，中國政府需要推倒限制外資流入和資金流出的資本管制“高墻”，同時放松對國內(nèi)債券市場和銀行業(yè)體系的嚴(yán)格控制。如果中國出現(xiàn)貿(mào)易逆差，這也將明顯推動人民幣在海外的流通。

　　Xie Duo, director of the financial markets department at the People’s Bank of China, says that the Chinese currency will eventually play a much larger role in the international financial system. But he admits: “It will take a long time to realise the internationalisation of the renminbi.”

　　中國人民銀行(People’s Bank of China)金融市場司司長謝多表示，人民幣最終將在國際金融體系中發(fā)揮更大的作用。但他承認(rèn)：“要實(shí)現(xiàn)人民幣的國際化，需要很長的時間。”

　　Yet one of the interesting dynamics of this process will be the pressure that builds up from the outside for China to open its markets more quickly than policymakers intend.

　　然而，人民幣國際化過程中一個有趣的動向是，外界要求中國以比決策者計劃中更快的速度開放市場，這種壓力正在積聚。

　　If the renminbi started to play a sizeable role in Asian trade settlement, it could lead to a rapid build-up in holdings of the Chinese currency outside of the country. As a result, Asia’s banks and leading companies would become a powerful lobby of investors wanting increased access to renminbi investments.

　　如果人民幣開始在亞洲貿(mào)易結(jié)算方面發(fā)揮重大作用，可能會導(dǎo)致人民幣的海外持有規(guī)模迅速上升。因此，亞洲的銀行和大企業(yè)將成為一個希望增加人民幣投資途徑的強(qiáng)大投資者游說群體。

　　“China will be forced by global market forces to make the renminbi fully convertible,” says Adam Gilmour, co-head of foreign exchange sales for Asia at Citigroup. “And when that happens, I expect a significant amount of the world’s reserves to go into renminbi.”

　　“全球市場力量將迫使中國實(shí)現(xiàn)人民幣完全可兌換，”花旗(Citigroup)亞洲外匯銷售聯(lián)席主管亞當(dāng)•吉爾摩(Adam Gilmour)表示，“當(dāng)這種情況出現(xiàn)時，我預(yù)計全球大量儲備都將流向人民幣。”

　　Indeed, one of the popular theories among analysts in China is that the central bank, which has in recent years been frustrated in various efforts to liberalise domestic capital markets, is fully aware of the pressures that even its small reform efforts will unleash.

　　實(shí)際上，中國分析師中流行的一種理論是，近來諸多旨在開放國內(nèi)資本市場的努力都宣告失敗的中國央行，完全清楚哪怕是小規(guī)模改革努力也會釋放出的壓力。

　　Under this reading, the build-up of large overseas holdings of renminbi through trade will provide the sort of outside pressure for reform of the financial system that entering the World Trade Organisation gave to the real economy a decade ago.

　　根據(jù)這一理論，海外通過貿(mào)易持有大量人民幣，將為金融體系改革帶來外部壓力，這種壓力與10年前中國加入世貿(mào)組織(WTO)給實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來的壓力類似。

　　If that is the case, then Malaysia’s dabbling in renminbi bonds will have been a turning point.

　　倘若果真如此，馬來西亞涉足人民幣債券的舉動，將成為一個重要的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)。